Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Email jones31luke@gmail.com with a description of the issue, steps to reproduce, and the affected component (gateway, browser extension, detector, or masker package). Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Scope

In scope: the gateway proxy, browser extension, detector and masker packages, configuration subsystem, and egress CA. We are particularly interested in any path by which a secret value, prompt text, or real↔mock mapping leaves the machine; egress CA key-handling issues; config-injection or ReDoS via policy files; and masking bypasses that let credentials reach a provider unmasked.

Design guarantees

• Metadata-only telemetry — exposure events carry counts and coarse labels, not values, prompts, or mappings.
• Fail-open for availability on masker failures (detector tier still scrubs credentials); fail-closed for invalid signed policy.
• No secret values to disk or logs; session mappings are memory-only on personal installs.
• Browser extension makes zero network requests on a personal install; the gateway calls only configured provider upstreams and optional org ingest endpoints.

Known limitations

Free-text PII beyond structured detectors may require an optional local NER tier. Pinned TLS clients cannot be intercepted at this layer. Bedrock coverage requires request re-signing and is not shipped. Vendor-locked agent backends require network-level routing — Wyloc does not claim to mask server-side orchestration.